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Democratic Justice and the Social Contract offers a theory of justice – democratic 
contractarianism – construed as the product of a social contract in which the contract is 
modelled as a form of joint agreement that can be empirically realized in a procedural 
democracy.  Its principal claims are:   
1. Principles of justice can be determined as the terms to which the parties to a social 
contract would agree, if they were negotiating to mutual advantage in circumstances 
of equal power. 
2. Such processes of negotiation gives us a distinct procedural understanding of justice.  
3. Common property resource regimes provide a relevant empirical exemplification of 
negotiation in circumstances of equal power approximately satisfying the conditions 
of procedural democracy. 
4. Such regimes incorporate relevant conditions of procedural democracy. 
It is taken to be a corollary of the theory that circumstances of equal power make for just 
practices, although the sustainability of those practices will require internalized norms 
motivating dispositions of conduct. 
 
Social contract theory captures the basic logic of the social cooperation necessary for a viable 
political and economic order.  The members of any society have both joint and separate 
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interests.  Their joint interests require them to cooperate in the production of public goods 
such as environmental protection, a well-functioning system of law and order or a reliable set 
of property rights.  By contrast, agents’ separate interests put them in competition with one 
another.  Thus, although the members of an agricultural community will find it in their joint 
interests to protect harvestable resources, like fish stocks or forests, they will each have 
reason to harvest as much of the resource to their own individual advantage as possible, 
usually with collectively damaging consequences for all.  Where agents have to cooperate 
with one another in the advancement of their common interests whilst still being in 
competition with one another in respect of their separate interests, they typically require an 
implicit or explicit social contract. 
 
Not all social contracts are just, however.  Just social contracts are defined as those in which 
the terms of association are agreed among those having approximately equal power.  How do 
we determine what principles would emerge from negotiations among those with equal 
power?  Democratic Justice adopts an empirical method, observing what happens under 
particular social and historical conditions.  The principal question facing those advocating the 
empirical method is whether we can find observable examples of forms of social organisation 
that we have reason to believe embody a rough equality of power among their participants. 
 
Democratic Justice claims that one important class of forms of organization in which there is 
rough equality of power are common property resource regimes.  Common property resource 
regimes are found in agricultural communities whose members harvest resource stocks – like 
fish stocks, grazing areas, water resources or woodlands – in common but with publicly 
agreed rules on what individual agents can appropriate from those stocks.  They are 
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empirically observable and they also embody a form of procedural democracy, allowing 
members to create and modify the rules under which each acts.   
 
What principles are derivable from such social contracts?  Because social contracts capture 
the principles of persons who need to cooperate with one another whilst simultaneously being 
in competition with one another, the terms of the contract need to provide each person with 
the assurance that the joint agreement will make them better off than they would be in a ‘state 
of nature’ with unconstrained competition.  In a state of nature one has a Hohfeldian liberty 
to appropriate what is not already appropriated by others.  From this position an observed 
point of joint gain is that participants secure the fruits of their own labour provided that those 
fruits are obtained under conditions of equal access to the means of production.  An 
entitlement to the full fruits of one’s labour, subject to equal access to the means of 
production, is the initial substantive principle of economic justice in democratic 
contractarianism  
 
The above paragraphs summarize the first three chapters of Democratic Justice.  Chapter 4 is 
given over to a discussion of the principal theoretical concepts that define democratic 
contractarianism, of which the idea of practical rationality is most central.  To suppose that 
the parties to a social contract can democratically overcome the collective action dilemmas 
they face requires us to posit that they have a form of rationality that goes beyond the 
standard expected utility account in terms of a consistent rank-ordering of alternatives.  
Instead, practical rationality requires choice to be the product of deliberation, and in 
particular of a form of deliberation that is reflective, exhibits the capacity to follow a chain of 
reasoning from premises to conclusions, ascribes to agents the ability to specify what is 
required by those conclusions, requires reasons for action to be self-determining and 
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recognises that all practical reasoning is defeasible.  These features of individual deliberative 
rationality will also enter into our understanding of public reasoning, defining its 
characteristics. 
 
How far one can generalise that understanding to societies other than those in which common 
property resource regimes are found, and in particular to large scale societies that follow the 
great transformation of industrialisation?  In reply to this question, a legislative conception of 
justice is suitable for great societies, so that there is no barrier in principle to prevent the 
principles of political and economic organization of common property resource regimes 
being applied, with suitable modification, to great societies.  However, in order to apply these 
principles, Chapter 5 argues that we need to take into account the political transformation 
from direct to representative democracy, the economic transformation by which corporate 
hierarchies organize the production of labour and the household transformation by which 
labour ceases to be based on the family unit and in which production and reproduction are 
separated. 
 
Because participants in a social contract have interests that are both common and separate 
interests, the institutions of representative democracy need to serve both types.  Chapter 6 
shows that in a representative system, the deliberative rationality that characterized successful 
common property regimes requires representatives to be able to deliberate over common 
interests and bargain over separate interests in the face of pervasive disagreement.  One form 
of democracy that can manage simultaneously to meet these conditions is majoritarian 
democracy founded on the principle of the proportionate representation of different interests.  
With more than one dimension of political conflict, the aggregation of different views will 
typically lead to majority rule cycling.  However, this is not a problem if such cycling is 
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confined to the set of alternatives that are located in the overlap of available alternatives that 
cannot jointly be defeated through processes of majority rule. 
 
The economic transformation gives rise to the issues discussed in Chapter 7.  In a market 
economy, the equivalent of securing the fruits of one’s labour is that one secures one’s 
marginal product.  However, the existence of corporate hierarchies within which work is 
organized often breaks the link between labour and marginal product.  Of itself, this does not 
undermine the legitimacy of the marginal product principle, since where people receive 
significantly more by way of income than any conceivable contribution to marginal product, 
the marginal product principle provides grounds for criticism. A more serious conceptual 
challenge comes from the claim that increasing returns to scale renders the marginal product 
principle irrelevant.  However, such returns do not license a principle of redistribution; rather 
they suggest the justice of each person contributing to the common upkeep of the institutions 
that make for public goods in a great society.  The just meeting of needs through some form 
of redistribution is best conceived in terms of transfers over the life-cycle rather than a 
transfer from relatively rich to relatively poor.  Moreover, given the separation in a market 
society of the value of marketable production and the value of work done in reproduction, 
democratic justice argues for child care costs being shared widely in society. 
 
The final chapter discusses the sense of democratic justice among individuals joined in the 
logic of a social contract.  Democratic contractarianism suggests a reconstructive account of 
how the sense of justice arises, namely as a response to circumstances in which there is a 
sufficient balance of power among agents such that they need to cooperate on terms of 
equality to mutual advantage.  This is not to say that the consciousness of such a balance of 
power is an element in the practice of justice, for the sense of justice may arise independently 
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of its theoretical reconstruction.  Nevertheless, the sense of justice acknowledges deep 
conflicts of interest, so that neither communitarian sentiment nor a notion of civic friendship 
is sufficient for justice.  What is needed instead is a strong sense of civic equality together 
with a willingness to play one’s part in a scheme of mutual cooperation, even when in the 
short term this may be to one’s disadvantage.  Only the cooperating partners in a democratic 
social contract can feel pride in their collective achievement through their civic culture.  Only 
in such a community will persons be for themselves but never only for themselves. 
